Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 9

Issue 2

Article 8

4-1-1992

Evidentialism and Theology: A Reply to Kaufman
Scott A. Shalkowski

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Shalkowski, Scott A. (1992) "Evidentialism and Theology: A Reply to Kaufman," Faith and Philosophy:
Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 9 : Iss. 2 , Article 8.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19929216
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol9/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

EVIDENTIALISM AND THEOLOGY:
A REPLY TO KAUFMAN
Scott A. Shalkowski

In "Evidentialism: A Theologian's Response," Gordon D. Kaufman presents
some reasons that explain why, given the renewed interest in the philosophy of
religion, theologians have paid relatively little attention to the work of contemporary philosophers. Philosophers have worked predominantly within the framework of traditional formulations of theological matters, and contemporary
theologians have reasons for abandoning portions of this framework. In this
discussion, I argue that the rationale Kaufman presents does not warrant abandoning central features of the traditional Christian theological framework.

In "Evidentialism: A Theologian's Response," Gordon D. Kaufman suggests
that theologians find contemporary philosophical discussions of evidentialism uninteresting because these discussions presuppose a questionable theological framework. l Kaufman and other contemporary theologians base their
doubts about this framework on information that was either not available to
or not widely recognized by earlier theologians. While some have concluded
that this new knowledge justifies the rejection of religious belief in general,
Kaufman draws the weaker conclusion that it merely exposes difficulties for
traditional theology. Kaufman bases his case against traditional theological
assumptions on the recognition of three things: (i) religious diversity, (ii) the
relations between symbols, experience, and thought and (iii) the responsibility of Christianity for grand-scale evils. In this paper I shall explain the flaws
in Kaufman's inferences. Though I shall not argue that the traditional way of
understanding Christian theology is well-founded, I want to expose why
Kaufman's case for a new framework is ill-founded. I conjecture that since
many theologians seem to accept inferences like Kaufman's, sometimes uncritically, philosophers of religion have largely ignored contemporary theology.2 Finally, I will argue that even if Kaufman's reasoning were acceptable,
he and other contemporary theologians cannot be wholly cavalier regarding
the issues surrounding evidentialism. These issues bear on the very case they
make for a more modem theological framework.

1. Religious Diversity
Philosophers of religion have typically been concerned with (i) the coherence
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of the concepts that are utilized by traditional theology and (ii) the rationality
of believing various religious propositions that embed these concepts. Kaufman points out that theologians are currently interested in more basic questions. Do the terms 'God' or 'Christ' pick out concepts that allow us to
formulate the most fruitful theology? How did these terms function in the
works of earlier Christian writers?3 The first question is obviously related to
what philosophers are concerned with when inquiring into the coherence of
traditional theistic concepts. The second is related to the philosopher's concern over the rationality of religious belief in at least one way. We must know
how 'God' functioned in the New Testament, for example, in order to know
what propositions the Apostle Paul intended to assert when writing the book
of Romans. Only after we know what propositions are at issue can we sensibly
ask whether it is rational to believe them. However, there is nothing in either
of these two theological projects that in any way warrants overthrowing
traditional theological frameworks. Focusing only on the first question, reflections that demonstrate the incoherence of a particular understanding of
omnipotence would warrant the search for a new framework only if omnipotence under the incoherent interpretation were an essential feature of the
old framework. Otherwise, one can conclude perfectly well that either the
interpretation exposed as incoherent is not what 'omnipotent' means anyway
or that a proper understanding of God does not require the concept of omnipotence. Either way, traditional God-talk is unthreatened. So, the reasons
theologians have for ignoring current discussions of evidentialism must cut
more deeply than those I have mentioned, if they are to be sufficient.
Kaufman seems to think that there is some inconsistency between claiming
that Christianity contains normative and distinctive truth-claims and a "careful, appreciative study" of other religious traditions. 4 But, there is no inconsistency in this at all. In fact, one can be fully convinced that Christianity is
the only correct system of religious truth and that all others are wrong to the
extent that they are inconsistent with Christianity, and still treat other traditions and their followers with the utmost respect, even gleaning truth from
them when this is consistent with Christianity. Claiming that Christianity is
true does not entail that it contains every truth and, hence, that the study of
other traditions, religious and nonreligious, is worthless. Hence, the recognition that there are alternative religious traditions which contain truths worthy
of our attention is not a sufficient reason to cease doing theology in terms of
traditional concepts, trying to determine what the doctrines of the incarnation
and original sin are all about, or claiming that these doctrines are true. One
can continue doing all these things and even admit with Kaufman that "comparison with other symbols and practices-for example, those of Buddhists
or Jews (or Marxists)-will illuminate dimensions of Christian faith and life
and symbols which have remained hidden to direct internalist approaches to
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theological questions."~ The recognition of diversity within or without the
Christian tradition warrants, at most, a type of epistemological humility.
Given that others seem sincere in their beliefs and practices (maybe more so
than I), I might be subject to error in spite of all I have done. Indeed, it is
arguable that such humility is required by Christian teaching. But, such humility in no way entails that one must relinquish the idea that Christianity
contains significant, unique truth-claims. A firmly held and vigorously defended belief in a given system is perfectly compatible with an openness to
new sources of truth as well as continued search for truth that may lead one
to change beliefs.
Recognizing religious diversity would provide grounds for a tentativeness
about one's belief in Christian doctrines only if one could see that it is at
least as rational to believe one of these alternatives. An alternative might be
at least as rational to believe when compared with Christianity only if it is
either (i) equally or better grounded in evidence, (ii) at least as properly
believed basically, or (iii) equally justified and does at least as good a job of
providing meaning for one's life. There must be something about an alternative that recommends it to us beyond its mere existence, since the construction of an alternative is really a trivial matter. Connecting an alternative to
the world and our life in the world is the difficulty. This is to say that
determining when an alternative system of belief warrants our attention requires that we first have some idea about what would make it proper to
believe the system and to change from one to the other. But, far from obviating current discussions of evidentialism in particular and the rationality of
religious belief in general, any inference from religious diversity to the second-rate status of traditional Christian theology presupposes some verdicts
on these matters. So, religious diversity does not warrant disinterest in concerns over rationality or evidentialism.

2. Conceptual Relativity
Perhaps the devaluing of traditional theology is warranted on the basis of
contemporary claims that traditional theology was not dropped from heaven
on golden tablets, but is in some sense a function of the cultural, religious,
and linguistic frameworks within which it arose. If this setting had been
different in significant ways, as presumably the settings were substantially
different where other traditions arose, the theology handed to the contemporary western world would have been cast in different terms. This, of course,
is a very large and subtle issue which I will not attempt to address in great
detail here. 6 Suppose, for the sake of argument, we grant this sort of cultural,
religious and linguistic relativity. As with the inference from religious diversity, the inference from the context-dependence of theological frameworks to
the "problematic character of all so-called 'religious truth-claims'" is faulty
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as it stands. Suppose that we would not be thinking about religious matters
in terms of 'God' rather than 'Brahman', if it had not been for the milieu of
the Hebrew tradition bequeathed to the early church. Suppose, further, that
the Hebrew tradition itself would not have been formulated in its terms, if
the early Hebrew writers had been in a very different setting. The most that
follows from this is that if there are truths about God, the divine nature, the
incarnation, original sin, etc., we might have missed out on finding them or
finding them plausible. If concepts are just the mental tools with which we
approach and communicate about the world, then, as with other tasks, if we
do not have the relevant tools at hand, we may not be able to do a particular
job. We might not have discovered the truths we have (if any) about God and
God's activity in the world, or we might have found them to comport so
poorly with other beliefs formulated with different concepts that we might
have thought that all propositions involving traditional God-talk were patently absurd. None of this, however, in any way shows that it is problematic
to claim that propositions involving these concepts are true. The truth or
falsity of these propositions is a function of whether there is a God who has
a certain nature and performed certain actions in the world. If so, some of
the traditionally Christian propositions are true; if not, they are false. This is
so, regardless of whether the concepts that are part of these propositions are
concepts we might not have used in thinking about the world. My six-year
old daughter's lack of a conceptual handle on quantum indeterminacy has no
more or less bearing on the truth of contemporary physics than someone else's
lack of a conceptual handle on the notion of God has with the truth of certain
propositions about God. All that follows from this sort of relativity is that
different people with different conceptual schemes may arrive at different
theories about the world. As long as these theories do not conflict, there is
no reason, on the basis of conceptual relativity alone, to conclude that claims
regarding the truth of separately-derived theories are dubious. Truth is called
into question, however, if they are incompatible. It is crucial to note here that
it is their incompatibility that warrants the conclusion that at least one must
involve some falsehood(s), not the relativity of their genesis. Cultural, religious, and linguistic relativity in no way warrant the claim that the concepts
used in traditional Christian theology are ill-suited for the task of theologizing
about ultimate reality, nor do they warrant a religious relativism which places
all religious traditions on equal footing.
The fact that many Christian writings and doctrines might, for all we know,
be articulated symbolically with multi-leveled meanings and without the main
intent to be truth-conveying, also fails to entail the rejection of traditional
theology. I know of no reason to think that all of the Biblical writings should
be construed as nonsymbolic. It is quite plausible to think that, even in the
process of trying to convey truth, the New Testament writers were, at times,
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more interested in motivating people to action or comforting those in distress
and confusion. Philosophers of religion may not have addressed these matters
often, not because there is some tension between these features of Christian
writings and traditional theology, but because philosophy of religion by its
nature focuses on the intelligibility of certain propositions and the rationality
of belief in them. Kaufman provides us with no insight as to how the multifaceted nature of religious discourse shows a flaw in traditional theology. If
one were to claim that having a correct philosophical theology is all there is
to religious belief or that the analysis of key concepts is all there is to
understanding the significance of religious discourse, then Kaufman's point
would be poignant. But, it is doubtful that philosophers, theologians, pastoral
leaders, and ordinary believers have made these claims so central to the
traditional theological framework that any weakness in its general structure
has been exposed by Kaufman.
Kaufman says that we need to recognize that religious claims are "to present a framework from within which basic orientation and meaning for the
whole of human life can be found," and that we must understand why we are
theorizing in terms of 'God' before we can appropriately consider the relevance of evidence to rational religious belief.1 Again, even if it is right that
religious claims constitute such a framework, this is not at all incompatible
with traditional theology containing a significant amount of objectively-determined truth. Surely, not any arbitrarily-chosen collection of truths, even
religious truths, will perform the important religious function of providing a
comprehensive framework within which the meaning for all of human life
may be found. That is a tall order for any collection of truths. But, granting
that any satisfactory religious system must perform this function, how does
this function undermine a given tradition's claims to truth, even if showing
the meaning of life is the primary task of religious systems? We might judge
competing systems on the basis of how well they perform this function and
use their performance as evidence for the general truth of the system(s) that
meet this standard best, or simply use it to determine which system, if any,
warrants our allegiance. This constraint on satisfactory religious systems,
however, does not undermine the claim that some religious system actually
contains truths; rather, the constraint entails that the relevant religious system
contain truths. If some measure of truth cannot be extracted from a system
that purports to be a framework for the meaningfulness of life, whether on a
literal or metaphorical level, then the system cannot provide such a framework, unless it does so in spite of itself. This claim, of course, hinges on what
it means for a system to perform this function. If a system is said to provide
a meaningful structure for life if it enables believers to act in ways which
make them feel significant in the grand scheme of things, then truth is not
needed. But, unless there is nothing to the distinction between thinking that
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one's life matters in the overall scheme of things and one's life really mattering (and I know of no argument which undermines this distinction), the
(approximate) truth of the framework that leads one to believe that one's life
is meaningful is absolutely crucial. If religious traditions are wrong with
respect to certain claims, human existence has no meaning at all and some
of the specific actions they recommend as particularly meaningful are, in
reality, worthless. Again, Kaufman leads us to consider features of religion
which are important, but which are not inconsistent with the truth and worth
of traditional Christian theology. He has given us no reason to think that the
traditional concepts are second-rate and that others are better, nor has he
given us reason to think that propositions formulated with them are neither
true nor rationally believed to be true by some.
Suppose we were to investigate sympathetically other religious traditions.
What would be the point? To see what they have to offer. But, what do they
have to offer, if not something based on some truths not contained in the
Christian tradition? Otherwise, the payoff could be only comforting illusions.
Yet, Kaufman's points regarding the relativity of experience and theory are
completely general and do not apply in any special way to the Christian
tradition. So, they can be applied to these other systems. If relativity undermines claiming truth for Christian doctrines, it does so equally for any other
system we care to evaluate, thus undermining one strong motivation for
looking elsewhere. We might allow this consequence and think that there is
instrumental good in such an investigation of other systems. Adopting one
set of religious beliefs might get one to do what is best or most fully human
more effectively than adopting another. But, this presupposes the truth of
certain normative claims, in particular those regarding what is best and most
fully human. These claims are often grounded in, or presuppose the truth of,
other propositions within the relevant tradition. Relativity will apply to these
propositions and, again, undercut the point of the recommended open-minded
religious search.

3. Christian Responsibility for Evil
The third motivation for abandoning traditional theological concepts is that
it now seems that Christian faith, Christian ways of understanding the world
and the human place within the world, a powerful Christian sense of divine
authorization and thus superiority over other religions, Christian imperialism,
Christian racism and sexism, and other characteristics and qualities of the
Christian religion and of "Christian civilization,'· bear some significant responsibility for [some of the appalling evils of the twentieth century].8

How so, exactly? What is obvious is that some purveyors of hate claim
Biblical authority for their attitudes and actions, though this no more shows
that the Christian tradition is responsible for instances of genocide than
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someone's waiving Russell's Why I Am Not A Christian during a sermon
shows Russell was tacitly a theist and responsible for the success of an
evangelistic campaign. Recently, there has been a veritable industry of writers
attempting to show that imperialism, racism, and sexism were in no way part
of the considered view of the writers of the New Testament. Given the historical context, recommendations which might be improperly imperialistic,
racist, or sexist now were perfectly proper and compatible with the recognition that all humans are properly valued in the sight of God. Whether this
case can be firmly grounded in historical and textual research is a crucial
question. Such research must fail, however, before we can warrantedly assert
that it is the Christian tradition itself that is responsible for various heinous
crimes against humanity rather than some benighted souls who misapplied
the Biblical texts to suit their own (unChristian) purposes. To the extent that
." we are aware of historical/contextual factors that infect our theories, beliefs, and practices, it is plausible to think that nonChristian factors have
adversely affected the behavior and attitudes of Christian people. 9 But,
surely, we are not compelled to baptize every attitude, belief, and action
of those who claim the title •Christian' as genuinely Christian. Taking
place in an environment in which Christianity is the dominant religion is
likewise insufficient.

4. Evidentialism and Theology
So far, Kaufman has not presented a good reason to think that "radical reconstruction of central concepts and symbols of the Christian faith" is necessary.l0 If this is correct, then neither has he given a good reason to think
that questions about evidentialism which are internal to the Christian tradition
are of little theological interest. Further, a positive case can be made to show
the significance of concerns over evidence for traditional beliefs. In fact,
contemporary theology itself tacitly legitimizes these concerns.
Even if we grant that certain issues are logically prior to the inquiry about
rational belief, it looks as though Kaufman himself relies on certain commitments regarding the rationality of particular religiously-relevant propositions, specifically those regarding the nature of revelation. So, while
Kaufman eschews inquiring about the evidence for propositions like God
has forgiven my sins or God is speaking to me now, since they are formulated in terms of traditional God-talk, he cannot avoid all inquiry about
evidence for religiously relevant propositions. To see that Kaufman's posture on the nature of revelation relies on certain assumptions about the
relevance and adequacy of evidence for such propositions, consider what
it is that makes some particular writing an instance of revelation. There
are at least two ways to understand the concept of revelation. The first, which
is the more traditional, is that a necessary condition for something to be a
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revelation is that it have God or some suitable divinely-inspired authority as
its source. So, the Bible is a genuine instance of revelation, only if God was
instrumental in inspiring writers to write various things, draw certain lessons
from history, or recommend particular courses of action, etc. According to
the second model, books of religious revelation are simply those which contain a humanly-constructed theory about the nature of God, God's will for
humanity, etc. Kaufman adopts this second approach to the Christian writings
when he says that "we do not know how the images and metaphors in terms
of which we conceive God apply, since they are always our own metaphors
and images, infected with our limitations, interests, and biases. (For just this
reason we dare not claim that they have been directly revealed by God.)"!!
On what basis is this claim made? Is it made on the basis of evidence or
not? Presumably, Kaufman asserts this claim on the basis of what he takes
to be adequate evidence that writings which are held as revelations exhibit
the gamut of human foibles. But if so, Kaufman's impatience with questions
of evidentialism cannot be general and cannot extend even to all propositions
that utilize the concept of God, since apparently he bases his own view
regarding God has revealed the Bible to humanity on evidence. If someone
believes that God did, indeed, reveal the Bible to humanity, Kaufman has an
interest in the general debate about evidentialism. Does one need evidence
in order to hold rational beliefs about the revelatory status of the Bible? If
not, then one could hold an opposing view on the nature of revelation in a
properly basic fashion. Kaufman needs to consider how strong his commitment to his own position on this matter ought to be. If acknowledging the
presence of religious diversity should warrant a tentativeness about the truth
of the Christian tradition, then acknowledging diversity on the nature of
religious revelation will warrant tentativeness about the nature of revelation
and, paradoxically, undercut an important support of Kaufman's claim that
traditional theology should be scrutinized with suspicion, namely that the
symbols and concepts embedded therein are of our invention and not of divine
origin.
This point is completely general and seems to indicate the following conclusion: it is wrong to think that there are issues that must be settled
absolutely prior to the investigation of the rationality of belief in a given
proposition. Of course, it is hard to see what this latter inquiry might be
in complete ignorance of the content of the proposition. If we are evaluating evidences, we cannot know what counts as evidence for the proposition until we first know at least some of its content. However, Kaufman
seems to think that we need to settle certain matters about the viability of
a theological framework before we worry about the relevance of evidence
to the rationality of religious belief. Yet, verdicts about rationality can
actually mute the force of the points he raises. To the extent that one
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rationally believes in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and loving
creator of the world who is working to redeem it from evil, one can rationally
believe that 'God' is a perfectly good concept to use in approaching religious
matters. Further, to the extent that the truth-claims of other approaches conflict with the existence of such a being, one can rationally believe that they
are theologically deficient approaches. While they may contain important
truth, they are not wholly on the mark. The more theological doctrines one
holds rationally, the more one can rationally legitimize on that basis the
framework within which one is working. If this is right, then contemporary
theologians should not view themselves as concerned with matters that must
be ironed out before we bother with the question of whether belief in a
particular system's doctrines is rational or before we bother with the question
regarding in what such rational belief consists. Questions of rationality may
actually save us unnecessary work in comparing religious systems and worrying about which, if any, contains some truth about the world. Rational
belief in God has forgiven my sins or God has revealed the Bible to
humanity allows one to rationally believe in the existence of God, and this
tacitly legitimizes theology which utilizes 'God' as a central concept.
I think that epistemological humility may well be a virtue which some
practitioners of the Christian faith do not possess, and that this lack of humility, when combined with other elements of our fallen nature, has led us
to do some rather unChristian things. However, thinking that we are rational
in believing a particular system to be true does not entail that "we try to make
ourselves the ultimate disposers of our lives and destiny"12 and thereby usurp
the rightful place of God. It simply means that there is something sufficiently
positive to recommend such beliefs and that, with respect to certain beliefs,
not everything is an irreducibly inscrutable mystery. At the same time one
can concede that there are many things about the ways of God that we do not
understand. The Christian tradition, at least, has plenty of grist for the humility mill; it reminds us of our proper submission to God and others. Our failure
to heed these reminders does not count against either the truth of Christianity
or the rationality of believing in its truth. 13 Truth is perfectly compatible with
the admission of a great deal of ignorance and the humble treatment of those
with whom we disagree. Whereas the doctrines of cultural, religious, and
linguistic relativity undermine the sympathetic treatment of other systems of
belief and their proponents, traditional Christian teaching has the resources
to motivate and justify such sympathetic treatment.
Nothing I have argued here shows that the Christian tradition is particularly
well-suited for doing the best theology and for coming to grips with our
lives in the world. Nor have I argued that there is no reason to inquire
sympathetically about truth that may be contained in other traditions. I
simply have tried to show that the evidences that are often brought to bear
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against traditional theology are insufficient to warrant a shift toward more
contemporary substitutes. In fact, to the extent that belief in traditional religious propositions is rational, whether on the basis of evidence or not, the
shift is unwarranted. 14
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know of no reason to think that this is at all required by the Bible, or later Christian
tradition.
14. I am grateful to Catherine Blaha for reading a previous draft of this paper.

